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HOLDING THE SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM
AT ARM'S LENGTH: THE SUPREME COURT'S STRICT
[AND CORRECT] INTERPRETATION OF TITLE VII IN
ONCALE V. SUNDOWNER OFFSHORE SERVICES, INC.

I. INTRODUCTION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids an employer
from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's ... sex."' In addition to prohibiting discriminatory hiring practices based on the potential
employee's sex, the Supreme Court has extended the language
of Title VII to afford employees a remedy for sexual harassment
in the workplace.'
Opponents of Title VII added the proscription against sex
discrimination while the bill was on the floor of the House of
Representatives as a last minute attempt to prevent Title VII
from passing.3 The measure proved unsuccessful, and the bill
quickly passed as amended, resulting in "little legislative history to guide [courts] ... in interpreting the Act's prohibition

against discrimination based on sex."4 In recent years, this lack
of legislative history has proved extremely frustrating to courts

1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994). Title VII states in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.
2. See Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); infra notes 20-32
and accompanying text.
3. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64.
4. Id. at 64; see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976), superseded by 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(k) (1979); Somers v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 464
F. Supp. 900, 902 (S.D. Tex. 1979) ("The legislative history of Title VIis prohibition
of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its brevity.").
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attempting to discern whether Title VII provides a remedy for
victims of same-sex sexual harassment.5
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that Title VII does not
categorically bar sexual harassment claims in which the claimant and the harasser are of the same sex.7 While conceding
that "male-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was
assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with
when it enacted Title VII," the Court, nevertheless, found "no
justification in the statutory language [of Title VII] or our precedents for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment
claims from the coverage of Title VII."' Critics cautioned that
the expansion of Title VII into the realm of same-sex sexual
harassment would essentially turn the statute into a "general
civility code for the American workplace."9 In response, the
Court declared that "common sense" and "careful attention to
the requirements of the statute" will prevent such a transformation.10
While Oncale resolves a split of authority among the federal
circuits over whether same-sex sexual harassment claims are
ever cognizable under Title VII, the Court's "cryptic" opinion"
does not discuss the inherent policy decisions surrounding the
recognition of such a claim. 2 Furthermore, the opinion fails to
clearly resolve what evidentiary route a plaintiff must take in
order to satisfy Title VII's causal "because of sex" trigger." As

5. See generally Dale Carpenter, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title VII,
37 S. TEX. L. REV. 699 (1996).
6. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
7. See id. at 1001-02.
8. Id. at 1002.
9. Id. (stating that "[riespondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for
the American workplace").
10. Id. at 1002-03.
11. See Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Harassment Claims After Oncale: Defining
the Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (1998) (stating that
the struggle to define what constitutes actionable same-sex sexual harassment "continues in light of Oncale's cryptic message").
12. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Postscript,Spring of 1998: A Response to Professors
Bernstein and Franke, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1258 (1998) (criticizing the Oncale
decision for "offer[ing] no theory of the wrong that purports to explain why same-sex
cases should be included in Title VIIs ambit").
13. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
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one commentator observed, "[ijf [Oncale] has opened the gates
[to same-sex sexual harassment actions], it has made little
effort to define the terrain that lies inside." 4
This casenote examines the Court's decision in Oncale while
considering the impact of the case on both opposite-sex and
same-sex sexual harassment actions. Part II discusses the historical background of sexual harassment claims under Title VII.
Part III reviews, in detail, the diverse treatment given to samesex sexual harassment claims among the federal circuits that
ultimately led to the Supreme Court's decision to hear Oncale.
Such detail is necessary both to chronicle the various theories
surrounding a same-sex sexual harassment claim and, in light
of the Supreme Court's non-elaborate opinion in Oncale, to
forecast the various circuits' treatment of the Oncale decision in
future Title VII actions. Part IV introduces the facts and procedural history of the Oncale case. Part V reports and explains
the Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Oncale. Part VI
analyzes the Court's decision, focusing on the strict construction
given to Title VII by the Oncale Court and the effect of the
opinion on future claims of both opposite-sex and same-sex
sexual harassment. Part VII offers a brief conclusion that anticipates the impact of Oncale on Title VII jurisprudence.
II. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ONCALE
A. Title VII: The Fundamental Text and Cause of Action
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of "sex." 5 In a traditional
Title VII claim, an employee recovers if he or she can prove
that he or she was denied a promotion, job placement, or equal
pay on the basis of his or her gender. 6 In addition to helping
14. Abrams, supra note 12, at 1260. According to Professor Abrams, "this is what
is ultimately unsatisfying about Justice Scalia's intermittently promising opinion in
Oncale: he recognizes the individual injury (and, by implication, some others sufficiently like it), but leaves the collective, integrative account of the wrong to another
day." Id. at 1263.
15. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); infra note 1 (quoting pertinent parts of
Title VII).
16. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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create workplace equality for women, 7 Title VII also prohibits
discriminatory employment practices against males because of
sex 18 and provides a cause of action for victims of such discrimination to obtain equitable relief, compensatory damages, or
punitive damages. 9
B. Title VII Extended to Prohibit Workplace
Harassment: The Meritor Bank Decision

Sexual

In the 1986 landmark decision, Meritor Savings Bank, F.S.B
v. Vinson,"° the Supreme Court extended the "no sex discrimination" command of Title VII to forbid sexual harassment in
the workplace. The Meritor Court reasoned that Title VII's
prohibition against discrimination because of sex covers not
only the "terms" and "conditions" of employment in the narrow,
contractual sense, but "evinces a congressional intent to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women [in the workplace]. " 2 Sexual harassment actions are subdivided into two distinct classes: quid pro quo claims and hostile
work environment claims.2 2
A quid pro quo claim for sexual harassment exists when
"sexual consideration is demanded in exchange for job benefits. '23 Alternatively, a "hostile work environment" sexual harassment claim is not predicated on direct economic gain or
loss. 24 As the Court stated in Meritor:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or abusive work
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial

17. See CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 235
(1979).

18. See, e.g., Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669,
683-84 (1983) (holding that the company's hospitalization policy, which provided female employees with more pregnancy-related benefits than those afforded spouses of
male employees, discriminates against male employees in violation of Title VII).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(1) (1994). The statute also grants the right of
a jury trial to either party to the dispute. See id. § 1981(c)(1).
20. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
21. Id. at 64.
22. See id. at 65.
23. Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651, 658 (4th Cir. 1989).
24. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66-67.
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harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that
a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return
for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living
can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of
racial epithets.'
The elements of proof necessary to establish a prima facie
case of hostile work environment sexual harassment differ from
the causal elements of a quid pro quo claim in one respect.
Under both theories, the plaintiff or employee must show the
following: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2)
the employee was the object of sexually oriented conduct; (3)
the harassment occurred because of the employee's sex; and (4)
the existence of employer liability. 6
The fifth element differs only with respect to how the harassment occurred. Under the quid pro quo theory, submission
to the sexual demands of the employer must have been a precondition to attaining job-related benefits or avoiding job-related
detriments." Under the hostile environment theory of sexual
harassment, the defendant's conduct must have had the effect
of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiffs working environment, causing it to be intolerably abusive. 8 In either case, the
victim's employer is liable for damages if knowledge of the
harassment can be imputed to the employer and the employer
fails to take corrective action.
Seven years later, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,"° the
Supreme Court refined the proper test for establishing a hostile
work environment sexual harassment claim, stating "[w]hen the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive

25. Id. at 67 (internal quotation omitted).
26. See Lisa Fair McEvers, Comment, Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor of the
Same-Sex, Is It Actionable?, 72 N.D. L. REV. 397, 400 (1996).
27. See id. at 399.
28. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67; see also McEvers, supra note 26, at 402.
29. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (declining to establish a bright-line rule, but concluding that agency principles apply and that such liability does not attach automatically).
30. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

262

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:257

working environment, Title VII is violated."3 ' The Harris decision inserted a "reasonable person standard" for judging whether the conduct at issue, considering all the circumstances, was
severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or
abusive environment. 2
III. SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS UNDER
TITLE VII, PRE-ONCALE

A. Introduction
While the guidelines published by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission have for some time recognized the
viability of a Title VII same-sex sexual harassment claim, 3
prior to Oncale the law among the circuit courts of appeals remained sharply divided. Ultimately, Oncale answers the
cognizability question of same-sex sexual harassment actions
under Title VII,"4 while creating an unclear standard on causation. 5 Thus, it is necessary to examine the "bewildering variety of stances" 6 assumed by the federal courts in order to understand the importance of the Oncale decision and forecast the
direction of Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence on the
issue of same-sex sexual harassment. 7
B. Title VII as an Absolute Bar to Same-Sex Sexual
Harassment Claims: The Fifth Circuit and the Garcia Decision
With its 1994 decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America, 8 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit became the
first federal appellate court to directly address the issue of

31. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 23.
33. See Fredette v. BVP Management Assocs., 112 F.3d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.
1997) (citing EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH)
3101 (1987)).
34. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
36. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 188 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998)
(stating that "federal courts have taken a bewildering variety of stances" when addressing same-sex, hostile work environment Title VII actions).
37. See infra Parts VI, VII.
38. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
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same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII. Garcia involved a
male claimant who alleged he was sexually accosted on numerous occasions by another male employee. " The plaintiff, a heterosexual male, specifically claimed that a heterosexual male
supervisor continually harassed him by approaching him from
behind, reaching around the plaintiffs body, grabbing the
plaintiffs crotch, and moving in a sexually suggestive manner.4" Other employees had also complained of similar conduct
by the supervisor.41 The company, however, interpreted the
behavior as mere "horseplay."42
In affirming the grant of the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court concluded that the behavior to which the
plaintiff was subjected "could not ...

constitute sexual harass-

ment within the purview of Title VII." Although the Fifth
Circuit seemingly resolved the case on other grounds," the
court offered as an alternative holding that "[h]arassment by a
male supervisor against a male subordinate does not state a
claim under Title VII even though the harassment has sexual
45
overtones; Title VII addresses gender discrimination."
According to the Fifth Circuit, Title VII categorically barred
as a matter of law both quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment claims when the claimant and the alleged
harasser were of the same sex. In support of the "gender discrimination" theory of Title VII, the Garcia court cited an unpublished Fifth Circuit opinion, Giddens v. Shell Oil Co.,46 and
the controversial 1988 United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois case, Goluszek v. H.P. Smith.

39. See id. at 448.
40. See id.
41. See id.

42. See id.
43. Id. at 452.
44. The defendants were granted summary judgment because none fell within
Title VIis definition of employer; however, "summary judgment in favor of all defendants was proper [because Title VII does not address same-sex sexual harassment] on
this basis also." Id.
45. Id. at 451-52 (emphasis added) (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208
(5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision)).
46. See id. at 451 (quoting Giddens, 12 F.3d 208).
47. See id. at 452 (citing Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D.
Ill.
1988)).
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In Goluszek, the federal district court denied relief to a samesex sexual harassment claimant.4" Like Garcia, Goluszek also
involved alleged incidents of same-sex sexual harassment between heterosexual males.49 The plaintiff in Goluszek lived at
home with his mother and was described by the court as someone who "blushes easily."" At work, the plaintiff was repeatedly subjected to the ridicule of his male colleagues who teased
him about his femininity and made provocative sexual remarks
in his presence.5 ' Complaints to his male supervisor proved
futile and ultimately subjected the plaintiff to more ridicule.52
The district court in Goluszek denied the plaintiffs sexual
harassment claim on the belief that, despite the plain language
of the statute, Title VII attempted to alleviate only gender
discrimination in the work place and should not be interpreted
to apply in same-sex sexual harassment claims.53 The court
reasoned:
The discrimination Congress was concerned about when it
enacted Title VII is one stemming from an imbalance of
power and an abuse of that imbalance by the powerful
which results in discrimination against a discrete and vulnerable group. Title VII does not make all forms of harassment actionable, nor does it even make all forms of verbal
harassment with sexual overtones actionable. The "sexual
harassment" that is actionable under Title VII "is the exploitation of a powerful position to impose sexual demands
or pressures on an unwilling but less powerful person."
Actionable sexual harassment fosters a sense of degradation

in the victim by attacking their sexuality. In effect, the offender is saying by words or actions that the victim is inferior because of the victim's sex.54

48. See
49. See
50. See
51. See
or bisexual,

Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456.
id. at 1453.
id.
id. at 1454. The plaintiffs coworkers repeatedly accused him of being gay
poked him in the buttocks with a stick, and showed him pictures of nude

women. See id.
52. See id. at 1453. The plaintiffs supervisor advised him to "get married and get
some of that soft pink smelly stuff that's between the legs of a woman." Id.
53. See id. at 1456.
54. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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The Goluszek court offered no legislative history to support
this holding,55 but relied solely on a 1984 student written note
in a law journal. 5 Thus, precedent was created that allowed
-other courts, most prominently the Fifth Circuit in Garcia, to
deny relief to same-sex sexual harassment claimants through
reliance
on Goluszek and the "dominant gender" theory of Title
VII.5 7
C. The Murky Middle: The Fourth Circuit and the Homosexual
Harasser
While some courts followed the Fifth Circuit in holding claimants never have a Title VII cause of action for same-sex sexual
harassment, other courts, most notably the Fourth Circuit,
allowed same-sex sexual harassment actions provided the claimant could prove that the harasser was homosexual." Courts
permitted such claims on the logic that "but for" the claimant's
sex, he or she would not have been sexually harassed, thus
creating a proper claim within Title VII's prohibition against
"discriminat[ion] ... because of... sex."59 Because the statutory requirements are satisfied, the fact that both the claimant
and the harasser are of the same sex becomes non-determina60
tive.
In McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors," a
cognitively disabled male named Mark McWilliams was repeatedly subjected by his coworkers to sexually charged teasing and

55. Indeed, little exists. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
56. See Goluszek, 697 F. Supp. at 1456 (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of
Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1451-52 (1984)).
57. See generally Carpenter, supra note 5, at 708 ("The dominant gender theory
of Goluszek-that same-sex sexual harassment does not violate Title VII because it
cannot create a climate hostile to the victim's sex or abuse the imbalance of power
between the sexes-has been followed by most of the courts rejecting same-sex harassment claims.").
58. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996);
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994); see, e.g., Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144.
60. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998)
(holding that an "inference of discrimination" is available to satisfy Title VI's statutory requirements where "credible evidence [exists] that the harasser [is] homosexual");
see also infra note 157 and accompanying text.
61. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
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roughhousing. 2 Forced to his knees on one occasion,
McWilliams was blindfolded and forced to "fellate" a harasser's
finger.63 While the Fourth Circuit found the conduct to be
highly offensive, the complaint did not state an actionable claim
of sexual harassment. To the McWilliams panel, Title VII's "because of sex" trigger was not met because none of the harassers
were homosexual.6 4 The court held that sexual behavior between heterosexuals of the same sex is never actionable under
Title VII.65 If McWilliams or any other same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff could prove that the harasser was either
homosexual or sexually attracted toward the plaintiff, then the
plaintiff could prevail. Only then would such harassment
be
66

considered to have occurred "because of.

.

.

sex."

The Fourth Circuit's hypothetical became verifiable several
months later. In Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,67 the
heterosexual plaintiffs gay supervisor and gay coworkers attempted, over a period of seven months, to entice him and
three other heterosexual male employees into performing homosexual acts.6" The plaintiff was able to prove the homosexuality of his harassers, and the court held that "a claim under Title
VII for same-sex 'hostile work environment' harassment may lie
where the perpetrator of the sexual harassment is homosexual."69 The court based its holding on the "simple logic" that "an
employer of either sex can discriminate against his or her employees of the same sex because of their sex." °

62. See id. at 1193. Specifically, McWilliams's coworkers asked questions about his
sexual activities, made requests to masturbate him, assaulted him by placing a
broomstick to his anus and fondling him to the point of erection. See id. at 1193,
1199.
63. See id. at 1193.
64. See id. at 1196.
65. See id. at 1195.
66. See id.
67. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996).
68. See id. at 139. In addition, the plaintiff was forced to listen to verbal descriptions of homosexual sex and was touched in a "sexual nature" by his harassers. See

id.
69. Id. at 141.
70. Id. at 142.
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D. The Sexual Orientationof the Harasseris Unimportant: The
Eighth Circuit
In the 1996 Quick v. Donaldson Co.7 decision, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to extend Title VII protection to all victims of
workplace sexual harassment, regardless of the sex or sexual
orientation of the claimant and the harasser.72
Quick involved a heterosexual male plaintiff who was repeatedly subjected to "bagging" incidents, whereby other heterosexual male coworkers would "bag" or grab the plaintiffs testicles
against his will.73 The plaintiffs coworkers also called him
"queer" and "pocket lizard licker" and repeatedly made homosexual references in his presence.74 The plaintiff ultimately
required psychological treatment and sued his employer for
sexual harassment.75
The district court, relying largely on a Goluszek-type analysis,
held that the plaintiffs same-sex harassment claim did not fall
within the parameters of Title VII.76 The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that as long as "'members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous ...

conditions of employment to

which members of the other sex are not exposed,"' then Title
VII's causal element is satisfied.7
To the appellate court, Title VII's protections extend "to all
employees and ... [prohibit] disparate treatment of an individ-

ual, man or woman, based on that person's sex."78 In rejecting
the Goluszek-style dominant gender theory of Title VII adopted
by the district court, the Quick panel held that "[p]rotection

71. 90 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir. 1996).
72. See id. at 1379.
73. See id. at 1374.
74. See id. at 1375, 1379.
75. See id. at 1375.
76. See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995); see
also supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
77. Quick, 90 F.3d at 1378 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25
(1993) (Ginsberg, J., concurring)).
78. Id.
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under Title VII is not limited to only disadvantaged or vulnerable groups. It extends to all employees.""
This holding placed the Eighth Circuit in direct conflict with
the Fifth Circuit, while also rejecting the Fourth Circuit's proposition that only when the harasser is homosexual does a claim
of same-sex sexual harassment fall within Title VII's purview. 0 In Quick, the Eighth Circuit held that "[a] worker
'need not be propositioned, touched offensively, or harassed by
sexual innuendo' in order to have been sexually harassed.""'
To the Eighth Circuit panel, "[i]ntimidation and hostility may
occur without explicit sexual advances or acts of an explicitly
sexual nature. Moreover, physical aggression, violence, or verbal
abuse may amount to sexual harassment." 2
E. The Seventh Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville: Workplace
Harassment That is Sexual in Content Is Always Actionable
In Doe v. City of Belleville,8" the Seventh Circuit developed
perhaps the most liberal analysis of Title VI's "because of...
sex" language. 4 After a thorough analysis of Title VI's sexual
harassment jurisprudence, the Doe court concluded that
workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation, or,
most importantly, motivations. 5 Doe, aside from Oncale, is the
only other same-sex sexual harassment case to which the Supreme Court has thus far granted certiorari.8 6 In vacating the
decision and remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit for

79. Id.
80. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
81. 90 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 989 F.2d 959, 964
(8th Cir. 1983)).
82. Id. (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988)).
83. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 118 S. Ct.
1183 (1998).
84. See generally Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Harassment Claims After Oncale:
Defining The Boundaries of Actionable Conduct, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 677, 714 (1998).
Storrow states that "Doe ventured further than any other decision in analyzing fully
the various concerns raised by same-sex cases, and it offered the most controversial
analytical paradigm for these cases to appear to date." Id.
85. See 119 F.3d at 566.
86. See City of Belleville v. Doe, 118 S. Ct. 1183 (1998).
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reconsideration in light of their opinion in Oncale,7 the Supreme Court has sent the message that perhaps Doe went too
far and Title VII should be more strictly construed."5 The case
is, thus, helpful in defining the outer limits of an actionable
same-sex sexual harassment claim.
The facts in Doe illustrate the inherent difficulty in differentiating conduct which is merely offensive and insensitive from
that which rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment.
Two minor brothers, J. Doe and H. Doe, were hired by the
defendant in 1992 to cut weeds and grass in the municipal
cemetery.8 9 The teenage boys received daily abuse from their
coworkers and their supervisor." J. Doe was nicknamed "fat
boy" and H. Doe, who wore an earring, was referred to as the
"fag" or "queer."9 ' The primary harasser referred to H. Doe as
his "bitch" and regularly commented that he was going to take
him "out to the woods" and "get [him] up the ass."92 The same
coworker, in one instance, cornered H. Doe and grabbed his
testicles, commenting "[w~ell, I guess he's a guy."93
After enduring two months of continual harassment by their
coworkers and supervisor, the brothers quit their summer
jobs. 4 Through their parents, they subsequently filed an action
against the City of Belleville, alleging claims of sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII.9 5 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on
all of the plaintiffs claims, primarily because both of the Does
and their harassers were heterosexual males and, therefore,
plaintiffs could not establish that they were harassed "because
of [their] sex.""
Justice Rovner, writing for the majority, reversed the trial
court, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to a trial on
87. See id.
88. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
89. See 119 F.3d at 566.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 567. This coworker, described as a "former Marine of imposing stature,"
also urged H. Doe to "go back to San Francisco with the rest of the queers." Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 567-68.
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their claims of sexual harassment.9 7 In answering the threshold question of whether same-sex sexual harassment claims are
ever cognizable under Title VII, the Doe panel concluded that
"[u]nless we read into the statute limitations that have no foundation in the broad, gender-neutral language that Congress
employed, it is evident that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim under Title VII, no matter what her gender or that
of her harasser."98
Having concluded that same-sex sexual harassment claims
were actionable, the Seventh Circuit then addressed the quantum of proof necessary to establish that the harassment occurred "because of sex."99 The court noted that sexual harassment is assumed to be "because of sex" when a female employee is harassed by a male coworker.' 0 Conversely, the court
also noted that by and large, most courts have refused to make
the same assumption "when a man harasses another man in
the workplace, however rife the harassment may be with sexual
innuendo, sexual contact, and other conduct of an explicitly
sexual nature."'0 '
In a resounding departure from the foregoing, the Seventh
Circuit held:
One may reasonably infer from the evidence before us
that H. Doe was harassed "because of' his gender. If that
cannot be inferred from the sexual character of the ha-

rassment itself, it can be inferred from the harassers' evident belief that in wearing an earring, H. Doe did not conform to male standards ....

The fact that none of the ha-

rassers are gay does not defeat the claim of sexual harassment, as the district court believed ....

[W]e do not agree

that same sex, sexual harassment is actionable under Title
VII only when the harasser is sexually oriented toward
members of his or her own gender. We have never made
the viability of sexual harassment claims dependant upon
the sexual orientation of the harasser, and we are convinced

97. See id. at 568.
98. Id. at 574.
99. See id.
100. See id. (citing Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985)).
101. Id. at 574-75 (citing McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d
1191, 1195-96 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d
745, 752 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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that it would be unwise and improper to begin doing so.
Fears that if such a requirement is not imposed, commonplace 'horseplay" will give rise to sexual harassment claims
are, we believe, unfounded."2
While the Seventh Circuit conceded that proving the harasser
was motivated to target one gender and not the other may be
required where the harassment is not sexual on its face, it
rejected the notion that such proof is necessary when the harassment itself is "imbued with sexual overtones."0 3
The court identified and rejected the disparate nature of
requiring proof of sexual orientation in the case of same-sex
harassment, stating:
Men sexually harass women in the workplace for reasons
other than sexual desire; but that does not detract either
from the sexual content of the harassment or from the
uniquely intrusive and denigrating impact sexual harassment has upon the women who experience it. So too, as this
case demonstrates, can men be sexually harassed without
the harassers (so far as we know it) acting out of sexual desire. . . We therefore reject the notion that same-sex
harassment amounts to sex discrimination under Title VII
only when the harasser is proven to be gay or lesbian.'04
The court continued:
[Wihen someone's gender is questioned on a daily basis,
when his co-worker regularly threatens to sexually assault
him in the woods, and when his genitals are grabbed for
the ostensible purpose of determining his gender, we must
question whether it makes a whit of difference why he was
singled out for abuse; whether his harassers were motivated
by his sex, by his purported sexual orientation, or by some
other factor, it would seem he has been harassed sexually
and his gender necessarily implicated. 5

102. Id. at 575.
103. Id. at 575, 577-78.
104. Id. at 590-91. The court noted, "[hiere, for example, the evidence suggests not
that H. Doe's co-workers were biased against men per se, but against men who did
not conform to their notions of masculinity." Id. at 592.
105. Id. at 593.
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F. Pre-Oncale Caselaw: Conclusion
With the Fifth Circuit in Garcia and the Seventh Circuit in
Doe representing the polar extremes regarding whether a samesex sexual harassment claim is ever cognizable under Title VII,
the federal courts remained "hopelessly divided."" 6 Some, like
the Fifth Circuit in Garcia, held that same-sex sexual harassment claims are never cognizable under Title VII. 0 7 Other
courts, most notably the Fourth Circuit, stated that such claims
are only actionable if the plaintiff can prove that the harasser
is homosexual and, presumably, motivated by sexual desire.' °
Still others, most notably the Seventh Circuit in Doe, suggested
that workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always
actionable, regardless of the harasser's sex, sexual orientation,
or motivations.' 9 By granting certiorari in Oncale, the Supreme Court would ostensibly attempt to provide some guidance.

106. See McWilliams
(4th Cir. 1996) ("[Tihe
hopelessly divided.").
107. See supra notes
108. See supra notes
109. See supra notes

v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.4
lower federal courts which have [addressed this issue] are
38-57 and accompanying text.
58-70 and accompanying text.
83-105 and accompanying text.
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IV. ONCALE: THE FACTS AND PROCEDU1RAL HISTORY

A. The Facts"..
In October of 1991, Joseph Oncale was employed as a roustabout on an oil platform in the Gulf of Mexico."' Oncale
worked as part of an eight-man crew which included the respondents in his eventual sexual harassment action: John Lyons, Danny Pippen, and Brandon Johnson."' No women were
employed on the offshore platform.
On several occasions, Oncale claims to have been subjected to
"sex-related, humiliating actions against him by Lyons, Pippen,
and Johnson in the presence of the rest of the crew.""' On
one occasion, with Pippen and Johnson restraining Oncale,
Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's neck." 4 In a separate, similar incident, Lyons placed his penis on Oncale's arm." 5 The
most graphic display of sexual assault occurred when, after
repeated threats of homosexual rape by Lyons and Pippen,
Pippen held Oncale against a wall in a shower on Sundowner's
premises
while Lyons forced a bar of soap into Oncale's
116
anus.

110. These facts are pulled largely from the district and appellate court opinions in
Oncale. Justice Scalia's opinion presents only a short summary of Mr. Oncale's
allegations, stating that "[t]he precise details are irrelevant to the legal point we
must decide and in the interest of both brevity and dignity we shall describe them
only generally." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1000
(1998). But see Abrams, supra note 12, at 1258 n.9. Professor Abrams suggests that
perhaps Justice Scalia is uncomfortable reciting the actual facts of the case, stating.
Presumably, the Court is referring to the dignity of Joseph Oncale,
although the conclusion that reciting the facts of an actionable legal
wrong somehow disgraces its victim seems both anachronistic (a
throwback to a time when sexualized injury was thought to reflect badly
on the victim) and surprisingly gender-specific (this reluctance is rarely
manifest in cases involving the sexualized injury of a woman). Perhaps
Justice Scalia means to suggest that in the interests of preserving the
dignity of the Court, he will not recite these distasteful facts.
Id.
111. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
112. See id. at 1001.
113. Id.
114. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118 (5th Cir.
1996) rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
115. See id.
116. See id. at 118-19.
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Oncale complained to supervisory personnel, but the company
took no remedial action and Oncale's concerns went unaddressed." 7 Indeed, Sundowner's Safety Compliance Clerk "told
Oncale that Lyons and Pippen 'picked [on] him all the time
too,' and called him a name suggesting homosexuality." 8
Oncale eventually quit, asking that his dismissal papers
reflect that he "voluntarily left due to sexual harassment and
-verbal abuse.""' When deposed, Oncale stated that he left
Sundowner because "I felt that if I didn't leave my job, that I
would be raped or forced to have sex." "
B. The ProceduralHistory
In May of 1994, Oncale filed suit against his former employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., and three coworkers
(Lyons, Pippen, and Johnson) in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Oncale's complaint
alleged both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual
harassment" in violation of Title VII's prohibition against
"discriminat[ion] because of ... sex."122
In March of 1995, Judge Porteus granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment.'23 While noting that Oncale's
allegations, if proven, would constitute "outrageous conduct by
the defendants which would be actionable under Louisiana
law," Judge Porteus wrote that Oncale's complaint "only alleges
violations of Title VII."2 Relying on the Fifth Circuit's "clear-

117. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
118. Id.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Oncale, 83 F.3d at 119.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994).
123. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A.94-1483, 1995 WL
133349, at *1 (E.D. La. 1995).
124. Id. at *1. Although it is unclear why Oncale did not file a state tort claim,
Judge Porteus alludes that such a claim may have been time-barred. See id. at *2
n.1 ("The Court is suggesting that plaintiff could have timely brought a state action."). But see John Cloud, Harassed or Hazed? Why the Supreme Court Ruled That
Men Can Sue Men For Sexual Harassment, TIME, Mar. 16, 1998, at 65 ("[Sundowner
Attorney Harry] Reasoner also points out that Oncale could have brought state assault charges against the men but went for a federal suit that could yield a fatter
award.").
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ly articulated ... position that same sex harassment does not
state a claim under Title VII,"11 Judge Porteus held that "Mr.
Oncale, a male, has no cause of action under Title VII for harassment by male co-workers." 6
Oncale appealed the defendant's summary judgment verdict
to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In May of 1996,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgFinding the Garcia decision to be
ment determination.'
"binding precedent, " ' the Fifth Circuit held that "same-sex
harassment claims are not viable under Title VII."129 Oncale's
request for an en banc rehearing was denied, and the Supreme
Court granted Oncale's writ of certiorari in June of 1997."'
V. ONCALE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the "unusually brief,"' seven
page opinion for the unanimous Court."' The issue presented
to the Court by Oncale was "whether workplace harassment can
violate Title Virs prohibition against 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' when the harasser and the harassed employee
are of the same sex.""'

125. Oncale, 1995 WL 133349, at *1.
126. Id. at *2; see also supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
127. See Oncale Offshore Servs., Inc. v. Sundowner, 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
128. See id. at 120. The Fifth Circuit panel held that Garcia could only be reversed by an en banc hearing or by the Supreme Court. See id. at 119.
129. Id. at 120. This is a categorical rejection of both quid pro quo and hostile
work environment same-sex sexual harassment actions as a matter of law.
130. Before deciding whether to grant certiorari in Oncale, the Supreme Court first
asked the U.S. Department of Justice to submit briefs on the subject of same-sex
sexual harassment. The Solicitor General ultimately appeared as amicus curiae in
Oncale to support the views of the petitioner, Joel Oncale. See Theresa Schulz, U.S.
Supreme Court Seeks Advice From Justice Department On Same-Sex Harassment Appeal, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 18, 1996, at 13,521.
131. Abrams, supra note 12, at 1257.
132. Justice Clarence Thomas also filed a one paragraph concurrence stating, "I
concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual harassment case, the plaintiff
must plead and ultimately prove Title VIis statutory requirement that there be discrimination 'because of.. . sex.'" Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S.
Ct. 998, 1003 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring).
133. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1000 (citation omitted).
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A. The Holding in Oncale: A Simple Reading of Title VII's Text
and the Court's Precedents Supplies the Backdrop
Because Oncale ultimately presents an issue of statutory
interpretation, the Court's opinion appropriately begins with a
recitation of the gender-neutral language of Title VII's text and
discusses the evolution of Title VII jurisprudence."' Particular
attention is given to Meritor's expansion of Title VII into the
realm of workplace sexual harassment as clarified by
5
Harris."
In a foreshadowing of events to come, the Court reminds the
reader that Title VI's "prohibition of discrimination 'because
of ... sex' protects men as well as women,"'36 and that "in
the related context of racial discrimination in the workplace we
have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will
not discriminate against members of his own race."3 7
Although the exact precedential value of Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County,13 ' a Title VII case ultimately decided on other grounds," 9 is unclear, the Court
seemingly cites to the decision in support of its holding in
Oncale. The Johnson Court, in dicta, "did not consider it significant that the supervisor who40 [promoted a female over the male
claimant] was also a man."1
Then, as "[ilf our precedents leave any doubt on the question",' the Court holds that "nothing in Title VII necessarily
bars a claim of discrimination 'because of ... sex' merely be-

134. See id. at 1001.
135. See id; see also supra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
136. Oncale, 118 S.Ct. at 1001 (citing Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682 (1983)); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
137. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001 (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 499
(1977) ("Because of the many facets of human motivation, it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of that group.")). The Court is alluding to the fact that
reverse-discrimination "because of ... sex" is entirely plausible.

138.
139.
140.
141.

480 U.S. 616 (1987).
See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1001.
Id. (citing Johnson, 480 U.S. at 624-25).
Id.
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cause the plaintiff and the defendant (or the person charged
with acting for the defendant) are of the same sex.""
After delivering the holding of the Court, the remainder of
Justice Scalia's opinion responds to the two main arguments
advanced by the respondents and their amici' in Oncale.
B. Did Congress Intend for Title VII To Prohibit Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment?
The Fifth Circuit and other courts that categorically excluded
same-sex harassment claims from Title VII coverage did so
primarily on the rationale that providing a remedy for this type
of claim was not the intent of Congress and, thus, outside the
scope of the statute.' Justice Scalia concedes that "male-onmale sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the
principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted
Title VII."' Justice Scalia concludes, however, that "statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our
laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by
which we are governed."46
Finding "no justification in the statutory language [of Title
VII] ... for a categorical rule excluding same-sex harassment
claims," 47 the Court is seemingly relying on the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. The Court states that "Title
VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' in the

'terms' or 'conditions' of employment. Our holding [in Meritor]
that this includes sexual harassment must extend to sexual
harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements."

142. Id. at 1001-02.
143. See id. at 1002. Amici curiae briefs were filed on behalf of the respondents,
Sundowner Offshore Services, by several organizations representing employers' interests, including the Texas Association of Business and Chamber of Commerce.
144. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
145. Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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C. What Will Prevent Title VII From Being Transformed Into a
General Civility Code?
In Oncale, respondents and their amici further contended
that "recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will
transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American
workplace."'49 The Court does not find this argument particularly persuasive 5 ° and assures that "careful attention to the
requirements of the statute" will prevent such a transforma15
tion.'
1. The First Requirement: The Court's Refusal To Delete
"Discrimination" From the Statute
Under the first requirement of the Court's two-part test,
plaintiffs in same-sex sexual harassment claims must always
prove that they were actually victims of "discriminat[ion] ...
because of ...
sex."'52 Workplace harassment, even between
men and women, does not automatically amount to "discrimination" merely because "the words used have sexual content or
connotations."' 53
Justice Scalia then provides four hypothetical fact patterns,
each of which, if proved, would support an "inference of discrimination", thus satisfying Title VII's causal requirement. 1"
In the first hypothetical, an inference of discrimination is "easy
to draw" in most male-female sexual harassment situations,
because the "challenged conduct typically involves explicit or
implicit proposals of sexual activity" and it is "reasonable to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of

149. Id.
150. See id. "That risk [of Title VII becoming a general civility code] is no greater
for same-sex than for opposite-sex harassment, and is adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the statute." Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. "The critical issue, Title ViI's text indicates, is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.'" Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
154. Id. at 1002.
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the same sex."'5 5 In the second hypothetical, the "same chain
of inference [of discrimination]" from the first hypothetical is
also available in a same-sex sexual harassment case if the
harasser is homosexual.'5 6 In the third hypothetical, Justice
Scalia presents a same-sex sexual harassment situation where
the female harasser is not motivated by sexual desire, but instead is motivated by a general hostility towards women in the
workplace. 5 ' In the final hypothetical, a same-sex harassment
plaintiff could "offer direct, comparative evidence about how the
alleged harasser treated members of both sexes in a mixed-sex
workplace" in order to support an inference of discrimination. 8 Ultimately, "whatever evidentiary route the plaintiff
chooses to follow, he or she must always prove that the conduct
at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted 'discriminat[ion]... because
of ...

sex." 5 9

2. The Second Requirement: Title VII Only Prohibits Severe or
Pervasive Conduct Which Creates an Objectively Hostile Work
Environment Considering All the Circumstances Including the
Social Context of the Alleged Harassment
Citing the Meritor and Harris decisions, the Court makes
clear that Title VII does not reach "genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely interact with
members of the same sex and opposite sex." 6 ' Title VII only
forbids discriminatory behavior "so objectively offensive as to
alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment."' 6 "'Conduct
that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a

155. Id.
156. Id. The logic behind this inference of discrimination mirrors the position of
the Fourth Circuit prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Oncale. See supra notes
58-70 and accompanying text.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1003. Presumably, "genuine but innocuous differences" include 'ordinary
socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual flirtation."

Id.
161. Id.
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reasonable person
would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title
162
purview.m
VII's
In determining the "objective severity of [the] harassment,"
courts and juries must give "careful consideration [to the] social
context in which [the] particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target."6 3 By using "[c]ommon sense and an appropriate sensitivity to social context," courts and juries will be
able "to distinguish betWeen simple teasing or roughhousing
among members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile
or abusive," thus preventing the transformation
of Title VII into
64
code.
civility
workplace
general
a
VI. ANALYSIS
A. The Court's Decision in
Application of Title VII

Oncale: A Strict and Correct

Respondents in the Oncale case argued that expanding Title
VII to cover same-sex harassment claims would ignore the
65
historical context within which the statute was enacted.
However, by failing to define the unambiguous word "sex,"
Congress effectively "relinquished the duty to delineate
proscribed behavior in the workplace relating to 'sex' in the
66
judiciary."
As Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote
in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc.,'6 7 "[w]here Congress has unmistakably provided a cause of action, as it has
through the plain language of Title VII, [the courts] are without

162. Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)).
163. Id. For example, "[a] professional football player's working environment is not
severely or pervasively abusive . . . if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he
heads onto the field-even if the same behavior would be experienced as abusive by
the coach's secretary (male or female) back at the office." Id.
164. Id.
165. See generally Brief for Respondent, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 998 (1998) (No. 96-568), available at 1997 WL 634147.
166. Amy Shahan, Determining Whether Title VI Provides A Cause of Action for
Same-Sex Sexual Harassment, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 507, 510 (1996).
167. 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying
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authority in the guise of interpretation to deny such exists,
whatever the practical consequences."168
Indeed, any excursion into an extra-textual interpretation of
Title VII by the Oncale Court would have broken the first canon of statutory interpretation: read the plain language of the
statute.'69 The text of Title VII is gender-neutral and does not
suggest that the particular gender of the harasser or victim
should be a dispositive consideration in a Title VII case.
Addressing this issue, the Seventh Circuit stated that "[u]nless
we read into the statute limitations that have no foundation in
the broad, gender-neutral language that Congress employed, it
is evident that anyone sexually harassed can pursue a claim
under Title VII, no matter what her gender or that of her
harasser."70
The statute's text simply does not support the Fifth Circuit's
categorical exclusion of same-sex sexual harassment claims:
The language of Title VII . . .does not purport to limit who
may bring suit based on the sex of either the harasser or
the person harassed .... It is, ultimately, the plain, unambiguous language of the statute upon which we must fo[Tihe words of
cus .... There is no ambiguity here ....
Title VII suggest that anyone discriminated against "because of' such individual's sex may bring suit, regardless of
his gender or that of his harasser.'
The Court's holding in Oncale is the only proper one under
the Constitution's structure of the three branches of the federal
system. Congress, not the Court, created Title VII. Congress
chose to use the unmodified word "sex" when referring to dis-

168. Id.at 144. The "practical consequences" alluded to by Judge Luttig include a
significant increase in Title VII litigation. See id.
169. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995) (explaining that
the first step in statutory construction is reading the language of the statute); INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that when
a statute's text is clear on its face, the Court should not look to the legislative history); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) ("[T]he starting point in
every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself." (citing Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975))).
170. Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 574 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 118 S.Ct. 1183 (1998).
171. Id. at 572-73 (internal citations omitted).
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crimination that is forbidden. This is a choice of an obviously
gender-neutral term, just as Congress chose to prohibit discrimination based on "race" rather than discrimination against particular racial groups. The Court would be overstepping its constitutional bounds if it were to deny relief to a claimant who
satisfied Title VII's statutory requirements in a same-sex sexual
harassment case where Congress has not
provided that such an
17 2
action is outside the scope of Title VII.

B. Oncale Eliminates the Absurdity of the Bisexual Harasser
The Fifth Circuit's categorical rejection of both quid pro quo
and hostile work environment same-sex sexual harassment
actions gave both bisexual and homosexual harassers "free rein
to victimize same-sex employees without the threat of liability."73 The Court's opinion in Oncale provides red-essability
under Title VII to all victims of discriminatory sexual harassment, and does not allow harassment that satisfies the statutory requirements to fortuitously proceed unchecked simply
because
the harasser and his or her victim are of the same
74
sex. 1

The absurd circumstances that would be created through an
acceptance of the Garcia rule are underscored by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in
the matter of Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management
Co.

75

In Pritchett, the plaintiff filed an action against her

former employer alleging that she was sexually harassed by her
female supervisor in violation of Title VII.176 Refusing to fol-

low seemingly binding Fifth Circuit precedent, 177 the judge
dismissed the defendant's motion for summary judgment 7 '
and acknowledged the logical absurdity that the Fifth Circuit's
rule in Garcia created. In Pritchett, the court held that it natu172. See Wrightson, 99 F.3d at 144 ("[Olur role as courts is limited to faithfully
interpreting the statutes enacted by the Congress and signed into law by the
President.").
173. Shahan, supra note 166, at 526.
174. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002 (1998).
175. No. CIV.A.93-2351, 1995 WL 241855, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995).
176. See id. at *1.
177. See id. at *2.
178. See id. at *1.
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rally would be a discriminatory practice to exempt a supervisor
from a Title VII sexual harassment claim solely because of that
supervisor's sexual orientation or the gender of his victim." 9
As stated in Pritchett, "to conclude that same-gender harassment is not actionable under Title VII, is to exempt homosexuals from the very laws governing the workplace conduct of heterosexuals." 8 ' Certainly, the broad reach of Title VII, as defined by the Court in Meritor and refined in Oncale, to "strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment,"' did not support such an exemption.
C. An Unclear Standard: The Court's Command That Judges
and Juries Use "Common Sense and an Appropriate Sensitivity
To Social Context" To Distinguish Between Ordinary Socializing
and Actionable Sexual Harassment
Critics have cautioned that an expansion of Title VII liability
into the realm of same-sex sexual harassment would open a
floodgate of litigation, transforming Title VII into a "general
civility code for the American workplace."" 2 In response,
Oncale commands that "[c]onmon sense, and an appropriate
sensitivity to social context will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable
person in the plaintiffs position would find severely hostile or
abusive.""
As one commentator has observed, "[the elegance and unusual brevity of Justice Scalia's opinion leaves it to the lower
courts to thrash out the distinction between common sense and
Another has written that the "Oncale opinion
nonsense."'

179. See id. at *2.
180. Id.
181. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001 (1998)
(quoting Meritor Say. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
182. See, e.g., 118 S. Ct. at 1002 ("Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-sex harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace.").
183. Id. at 1003.
184. Clarence Page, The Great Nerd Protection Decision of 1998, THE SACRAMENTO
EXAMIINER, Mar. 15, 1998, at A16. Mr. Page, a nationally syndicated newspaper columnist, is largely critical of the Court's approach, writing that "one person's objective-
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contains a remarkable call for contextualization in the assessment of sexual harassment, tempered only by Scalia's confident
and perhaps solipsistic suggestion that one can resolve these
cases with a healthy dose of common sense."'85
The one example of contextualization that the Court provides
(of a football coach smacking his players on the buttocks) 86 is
illustrative of the inherent ambiguity of the Court's rationale.
For example, what would be the outcome if the place kicker on
Justice Scalia's hypothetical football team were a female? If a
male coach's "smack" on the female kicker's buttocks was indeed "experienced" 87 by the female as offensive, then the
coach's conduct may very well be classified as abusive. Either
way, the existence of valid arguments on both sides illustrates
the difficulty lower courts and juries will have applying the
Court's standard. Clarification will require that the high court
review a case more fully developed at trial rather than one disposed on summary judgment.
D. How Do Future Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs
Satisfy Title VII's "Because of... Sex" Causation Element?
As one commentator noted:
Oncale is in many respects an enigma. In an effort to
give a conclusive answer to a case that, by all appearances,
he would have preferred not to consider, Justice Scalia
skirted the "what," the "how" and the "why" of sexual harassment ....
and provided only a few hints as to how
decisionmaking in these cases should occur.188
ness is another person's bullfeathers" and "one person's common sense is another
person's nonsense." Id.
185. Abrams, supra note 12, at 1258-59.
186. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1003; see also supra note 164 and accompanying
text.
187. See id. at 1003 ("In same sex (as in all) harassment cases, [determining
whether alleged conduct constitutes actionable sexual harassment] requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experienced by its target.") (emphasis added). It is also doubtful that a male coach's slapping of a female player's buttocks is considered a social norm.
188. Abrams, supra note 12, at 1258. To Professor Abrams, "Justice Scalia's opinion strikes me as holding the sexual harassment claim somewhat at arm's length. My
perception may be colored in part by the lack of solicitude Justice Scalia has manifested toward constitutional discrimination claims raised by women, gays, and lesbi-
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In the words of Judge Brody of the United States District
Court for Maine, "[c]ourts are only beginning to decipher the
'because of ... sex' requirement emphasized in Oncale."189 A
plaintiff must ultimately prove the causation element of Title
VII as part of his or her prima facie case of sexual harassment.
As the Supreme Court stressed in Oncale, if the plaintiff cannot
offer evidence to prove that he or she was harassed "because
of... [his or her] sex," a Title VII claim will not lie.190
The easiest way for a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff to
satisfy Title VIi's causal element is to prove that his or her
harasser is either homosexual or bisexual. The Oncale decision
clearly establishes an "inference of discrimination [because
of... sex]" under such facts.' 9 ' While a lack of such evidence
does not render a plaintiff unable to establish a prima facie
claim of same-sex sexual harassment, it certainly makes the
case more difficult to prove. Presumably, the plaintiff must offer
proof that the harasser only harassed employees of his or her
own sex in such a manner that the harasser's conduct demonstrates a "general hostility to the presence of [members of his
or her sex] in the workplace." 92
What is far less clear is whether a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff can ever satisfy Title ViI's "because of... sex"
causation element where an alleged heterosexual harasser verbally assaults the plaintiff in an extremely sexual manner by
referring to lewd sexual conduct. The Oncale decision does not
conclusively shut the door on such a claim; it simply states that
ans." Id. at 1258 n.8 (citing United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264, 2299 (1996)
(Scalia, J. dissenting) (arguing against recognition of an equal protection claim
brought by women against Virginia's maintenance of an exclusively male military
college); Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Colorado's constitutional amendment, which prevents homosexuals from receiving
legislative, executive, or judicial protection from discrimination, does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause)). "But it is also shaped by the unusual features of the
Oncale opinion ...
and partly from the brevity with which he disposes of the case,
punctuated by hasty reassurances that difficult cases can be resolved by common
sense." Id. (emphasis added).
189. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 (D. Me.
1998).
190. See Oncale, 118 S. Ct. at 1002.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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a same-sex sexual harassment plaintiff must do more than
prove that the "conduct at issue ... [is] merely tinged with
offensive sexual connotations." 93
The Supreme Court's decision to vacate, without opinion, the
judgment of the Seventh Circuit in Doe v. City of Belleville,'
in light of Oncale, seems to limit the viability of a genderbased, as opposed to sex-based, approach to proving causation
under Title VII. For example, in Doe, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[A] man who is harassed because his voice is soft, his physique slight, his hair long, or because in some other respect
he exhibits his masculinity in a way that does not meet his
co-workers' ideas of how men are to appear and behave, is
harassed "because of' his sex.'95
The Doe Court concluded that "gender stereotyping establishes
the link to the plaintiff's sex that Title VII requires."'9 6
In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Doe, Judge
Manion disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the particular behavior alleged constituted actionable harassment under
Title VII and suggested a much narrower reading of Title VIrs
"because of ... sex" requirement.'97 Judge Manion instead
concluded that the harassment occurred because "H. Doe wore
an earring, not because H. Doe was a male."' Judge Manion
criticized the majority for "shift[ing] the focus from the
individual's sex (male or female) to sexuality,"9 9 given that
"Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of 'sexuality,' 'sexual orientation,' 'something linked to sex,' or anything
the victim is a man, or
else-only discrimination ... because
20 0
because the victim is a woman."

193. Id.
194. 119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 118 S. Ct.
1183 (1998).
195. Id. at 581.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 599-601 (Manion, J., concurring and dissenting).
198. Id. at 601.
199. Id. at 603.
200. Id. at 604.
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To at least one federal jurist, "[t]he Supreme Court's vacation
of the decision in [Doe] 'in light of Oncale' suggests that the
Court may favor Judge Manion's stricter reading of the term
'sex' over the majority's broader use of the term 'gender."'2 '
VII. POST-ONCALE: NOT EVERYONE WILL WIN

In the days following the Oncale decision, it was hard not to
find a particular interest group which did not appear satisfied.
Gay rights activists "praised" the decision," 2 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was "pleased" with the decision, 2°3 and Sundowner Attorney Harry Reasoner stated that
Oncale was "easily defensible on remand."2 4
On remand, however, Mr. Oncale will likely try to assert or
seek discovery into the sexual orientation of his harassers, in
hopes of receiving the ever-difficult "inference of discrimination"
that the Court held is available when a same-sex harassment
plaintiff is the victim of a homosexual harasser. Increased inquiry into sexual orientation does not seem like the sort of
"victory" advocates of gay rights should celebrate; indeed, such
inquiry could lead to the reduced hiring of homosexual employees by employers looking to escape liability from same-sex sexual harassment suits.0 5
The Oncale decision requires further refinement in the federal system before predictable patterns in same-sex harassment
cases begin to emerge. In the meantime, employers are best
advised to follow Justice Scalia's directive and treat all claims
201. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 66, 75 n.9 (D.
Me. 1998).
202. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Court Says Law Covers Same Sex Harassment, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 1998, at Al.
203. See, e.g., Nadya Aswad, Title VII Prohibits Same-Sex Harassment, Supreme
Court Rules in Unanimous Opinion, U.S. L. WK, Mar. 6, 1998, at D6.
204. Id.
205. One commentator has even suggested that juries will issue disproportionately
higher damages in same-sex cases than in opposite-sex cases and that these higher
damage awards will in turn inspire employers to discriminate against gays and lesbians. See E. Gary Spitko, He Said, He Said: Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Under Title
VII and the "ReasonableHeterosexist" Standard, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 56,
84 (1997). But see Storrow, supra note 11, at 729 (arguing against Spitko's theory).
Federal courts have thus far refused to extend Title VII protection to people on the
basis of their sexual orientation.
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of sexual harassment with "common sense" and appropriate
responsiveness.

Thomas I. Queen, Jr.

